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Roles of regional, national and European policies in the 
development and catching up of Less Favoured Regions* 
 
Paper  prepared  for the Final Report of the CONVERGE project (TSER Programme SOE2-
CT98-2047) by  Emilio  Muñoz,  UPC, CSIC, Madrid, in collaboration with the CONVERGE 
team: Manuel Mira Godinho (CISEP, Lisbon), coordinator of the project; Jean-Alain Héraud 
(BETA, Strasbourg), R. Evangelista (CNR, Rome), J. Cogan and J. McDevitt (University 
College, Dublin) and A. Isaksen (STEP, Oslo) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
One of the first goals of the CONVERGE project was to get a proxy explanation of the process of 
convergence in Europe. The present part of the report aims to analyse the influence of policies 
related to science, technology and innovation in the economic development of the Less Favoured 
Regions (LFRs) of Europe. 
  
Different instruments and policies have been proposed to correct for the structural deficits that lead 
to gaps in convergence. On one side, experts propose measures relative to the main economic 
stream such as to introduce greater flexibility and liberalisation of the labour and service markets. 
Others propound the need of more innovation, R&D activities and civil infrastructures which 
implies the requirement of structural reforms in institutional, R&D and education policies. 
 
By the same nature of the CONVERGE project, the work of the partners has focused on the analysis 
of the relevance of the innovation policies in their countries and regions for economic development, 
in agreement with the second line of initiatives that has been proposed above as an instrument for 
the catching-up of the less developed Europe. 
 
Therefore, the present paper aims to analyse the outcomes of the innovation policies and their 
effects on catching-up under the comparative frame of what is being discussed, assessed and 
developed in Norway and the Alsace and Baden regions as a reference for a benchmarking exercise. 
The theoretical frame supporting the comparative analysis refers to the current concepts of 
"knowledge-based economy" and "systems of innovation" as both being considered good 
instruments to leave aside the idea of uniform process taking place in all countries and to 
                                                 
* This part has been prepared by Emilio Muñoz on behalf of the CONVERGE team and he is indebted to the colleagues 
of the CONVERGE Project for many illuminating discussions and for their contributions to the analysis of policies 
section. Acknowledgement extends to other collaborators that participated in the project: J. Caraça, F. Gonçalves, V. 
Corado Simoes, R. Pais Mamede (Lisbon), Juan Espinosa de los Monteros, V. Díaz Benito (Madrid), S. Iammarino, A. 
Silvani (Rome). 
 
This review paper draws on the work that has been performed in the course of the CONVERGE Project and stems in 
previous analysis of the project  team on the process of catching up of the Less Favoured Regions (Portugal, Ireland, 
regions of Spain and Italy) with respect to a benchmarking exercise derived from France and Norway as the more 
developed countries involved in the project. The analysis has explored contributions from other authors and different 
projects funded by the European Framework Programme. 
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understand the diversity of the transformation processes and the different paths followed by each 
country or region in their walk to the new economy. 
 
1.1 Measurement and indicators 
 
There are still great challenges of  measurement to assess the value and efficiency of those 
concepts. 
 
1.1.1Capacity for Innovation 
 
The ability to measure the knowledge economy is still insufficiently developed as it directs attention 
to a variety of intangibles. Currently, the knowledge economy is measured by a number of old and 
new indicators (Remoe, 2000). 
 
On the other hand, the main outcome of the System of Innovation is to create a (National or 
Regional) Capacity for Innovation which is able to influence the performance of the countries (or 
regions) in terms of growth, employment and competitivity.  
 
The outcome of an effective Capacity for Innovation must be reached through the outputs of the 
basic elements or actors that built up the System of Innovation. The basic  elements -public research 
organisms, scientific systems, firms, interface and support institutions- can be assimilated to the 
classical elements of the R&D systems -the science and technology part- whose inputs and outputs 
are being analysed with the conventional OECD indicators to which new indicators have been 
added to measure innovation performance, essentially thanks to the Community Innovation Survey. 
 
1.1.2 New indicators. Cooperation. 
 
These indicators have to take into account the shift in paradigm above from a linear model of 
innovation towards an interactive one as well as the increasing importance of SMEs in relation to 
their regional localisation. 
 
A key feature of this new paradigm is the interactive learning. This behaviour has been always 
implicit in the realm of science base but has to be incorporated now in the behavioural strategies of 
firms.  
 
1.1.3 Involvement of SMEs 
 
SMEs are becoming an important player within the innovation systems concept. They are sharing 
an increasing part of the employment growth from the last decades as well as of the economic 
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wealth of countries and regions. Some confluent reasons may argue in explaining the situation. The 
SMEs are expanding in some specific sectors, classical manufacturing and new services. The 
growth of the small firms reflects rationalisation strategies and restructuring  of large firms as an 
effect of the recessions from the 1970s onwards rather than the action of the small firms sector by 
itself. Third, the growth of the SMEs is also a reflection of the downsizing strategies of the large 
strategies that led to outsourcing to suppliers and subcontractors. According to the evolution of 
industrial organisation towards a more networked form, Isaksen and Remoe (2001) have 
underscored the increased need for cooperation between firms and knowledge producing 
organisations and the inadequacy of viewing SMEs "as a distinct group of firms and as a separate 
target group for innovation policy". 
 
1.1.4 The relevance of regionalisation 
 
The increasing involvement and relevance of SMEs in the performance of the innovation systems 
and their becoming an important target of innovation policy imply a greater importance of the 
regional level for the analysis of the innovation outcomes. 
 
The need for intermediary organisations that may help in the transfer of knowledge and technology 
from universities and public research institutes to SMEs can be better satisfied through "local" 
organisations and "regional" policies. 
 
The idea that innovation activity is a territorial phenomenon has been present in the literature on 
innovation and has gamed relevance with the notion of regional systems of innovation. As Isaksen 
and Remoe have stated (2001) the emergence of regional innovation policies and the development 
of systems of innovation has been laid out from the experiences and policy instruments of "success 
stories" - Italian industrial districts, Baden - Wurttemberg dynamism. In these cases, innovation in 
SMEs is seen as taking place around geographic clusters of small firms (OECD 1998 cited by 
Isaksen and Remoe, 2001).  
 
1.2 Approaches to the identification of best practices in innovation policy 
 
The recognition of the quality and relevance of innovation for the economic wealth of developed 
countries has led to searching for permanent "best practice" policy valid for each situation. This was 
an underlying aim of the CONVERGE project with the argument that this must be a recipe of policy 
instruments that would help to the LFRs for better succeeding  in the process of catch-up. 
 
However the analysis of the cases that we have explored at European, country and regional level 
reveals that the variety of geographical contexts, the organisation of the R&D base, the firms' 
abilities, attitudes, acting as forces and barriers towards innovation are preventing the finding of 
such "best practice". 
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European level 
 
The SMEPOL project was carried out under the "Targeted Socio-Economic Research" programme 
as a collaborative project of 7 academic groups from Austria, Denmark, Italy, The Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain and UK. The project has attempted to answer several key questions relating the 
relevance of the policy instruments to theory, real needs from companies, correspondence between 
aims and instruments, efficiency of the instruments, achievements, impacts and level of 
coordination of the innovation policy instruments with the rest of the policy system (Nauwelaers 
and Wintjes, SMEPOL report). 
 
The key message is that there is no "one-size-fits-all" policy portfolio. The regional differences in 
innovation capabilities are driving to the necessary blend of policy instruments and the development 
of "policy intelligence" as a means to obtain the best results from a confrontation between theory, 
ideas and reality. 
 
On the other hand, the European Commission has been strongly involved in the promotion of the 
level of innovation in the European Union. The Green Book on Innovation published in 1995 rang 
the bell of the limits to innovation in Europe and represented a first step in that policy while 
proposing a wide field of action for innovation in the world of firms (Bulletin from EU, supplement 
5/95). Along the year 2000 a series of publications made by the Directorate on Innovation, Unit on 
Communication and Public Awareness under the heading "Innovation and Transfer of Technology" 
have been echoing the relevant role of innovation for challenging the processes of globalisation and 
the new knowledge - based economy. 
 
The Commission recognised that a policy for business (or industrial policy) should include today a 
strong bet for stimulating the innovation strategies and capabilities of firms, with measures or steps 
oriented to foster the creation and development of highly innovative firms, frequently associated to 
new technologies -"start ups", "spin-offs"-, the transfer of new ideas, knowledge and technology, as 
well as the settlement of an environment that may facilitate the thriving of firms. 
 
The innovation policy from the European Commission had the guarantee of these conditions as its 
main goal. In spite of this endeavour, the global level of innovation within the European Union 
remains low and rather inadequate to compete with the two main competitors of Europe: United 
States and Japan. 
 
The European Commission  has recommended the application of learning processes of "best 
practices" as a way to improve the level of innovation capacities and to correct for the existing gaps. 
However the SMEPOL project has concluded on the difficulties to identify such "best practices" in 
a context of complexity showing the distance existing between wishes and realities.  
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Table 1.    European indicators on outcomes of innovation, and comparison of the CONVERGE countries by the European indicators  
              of innovation with respect to European Union average 
 
N. Description of indicator Source / Year EU Norway France Italy Ireland Portugal Spain 
1 Human resources     
1.1 Proportion of graduates in science and 
technology in the higher education sector. 
Eurostat (stastistics on 
education) 
1997 
37 31 32 39 28 32 
1.2 Percentage of active population holding a 
higher degree 
OECD 
1996 
13 19 10 8 11 7 13 
1.3 Share of employment in medium and high 
technology industry1 
Eurostat (R&D stastistics and 
Data on Employment) 
1998 
7.7 7.0 7.5 7.4 3.5 5.5 
1.4 Share of employment in high technology 
services 
Same 
1998 
 
3.0 3.6 2.6 2.4 1.4 1.9 
2 Knowledge production     
2.1 Government (public) expenses in R&D as 
% of GDP (GERD) 
Eurostat, OECD 
1998 
0.70 0.8 0.90 0.53 0.32 0.44 0.36 
2.2 Business expenditure in R&D as % of GDP 
(BERD) 
Eurostat, OECD 
1998 
1.20 1.38 0.55 1.03 0.14 0.44 
2.3 Number of patents solicitors in high 
technology per million inhabitants 
Eurostat, OECD 
1998 
14.9 16.3 4.2 0.9 0.0 1.7 
3 Transfer and application of knowledge     
3.1 Share of industrial SMEs involved in 
innovation 
Eurostat (Innovation survey) 
1996 
44.0 36.0 44.4 36.0 21.8 - 
3.2 Share of industrial SMEs involved in 
cooperative projects 
Eurostat (Innovation survey) 
1996 
11.2 15.6 12.0 4.7 23.2 4.5 4.6 
3.3 Total expenses in innovation of the 
industrial sector as % of total turnover 
Eurostat (Innovation survey) 
1996 
3.7 4.3 3.9 2.6 3.3 1.7 1.8 
                                                 
1 Medium and high technology sectors are: chemistry (NAAB 24), Office equipment (NAAB 30), electronic equipment (NAAB 31), telecommunications equipment (NAAB 32), optical and 
precise instruments (NAAB 33), automobile (NAAB 31), aerospace and other transport (NAAB 35). 
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4 Financing of innovation, results and 
markets 
    
4.1 Risk capital in technology firms (%GDP)2 Data of European Association 
of Risk Capital 
1999 
0.06 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.02 
4.2 Capital investment in new markets (% 
GDP) 
International Federation of 
Stock Markets 
1999 
  3.4 4.7 1.1 0.4 0.2 - 
4.3 Share of sales of innovations in the market 
of the industrial sector 
Eurostat (Innovation survey) 
1996 
6.5 7.8 7.9 13.5 8.4 7.2 9.5 
4.4 Share of Internet users per 100 inhabitants Eurostat (International Union of 
TICs) 
1999 
14.9 37.8 9.7 8.7 11.8 7.0 7.2 
4.5 Share of TIC Markets (% GDP) European Observatory on 
Information Technology 
1997 
5.0 5.0 4.7 5.7 4.9 3.9 
4.6 Changes in the share of the total production 
of OECD in high technology sectors 
OECD 
1996 
 -15 -12 - - - 
          
 
 
Source: Innovación & Transferencia de Tecnología (número especial) Comisión  
             Europea, Programa de Innovación/PYMES, Noviembre 2000.     
 
 
Source: For Norway, Remoe (2000), for the other countries "La innovación en una economía 
  del conocimiento", Innovación y transferencia de tecnología (Número especial),  
  Comisión Europea, Programa Innovación/PYMES, Noviembre 2000. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The technology sectors include: telecommunications, internet, informatics, software, services, semi- conductors, other electronic components, medical supplies, biotechnology. 
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2. Analysis of policies. The comparative frame of the CONVERGE project 
 
This part enters into the analysis of the practical policies that have been developed in some 
"favoured" regions to compare these dynamics with those taking place in the "less favoured regions 
of Europe" compared under the CONVERGE frame:  Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
 
This analysis has attempted to go beyond the comparison in terms of the macroeconomic nature of 
the concept of "normal" convergence by exploring the effects of a series of related policies on the 
indicators that the European Commission has elaborated to compare the situation of innovation in 
Europe. The analysis presented here is two-fold. On the one side, there is a quantitative analysis of 
the positions of the countries with respect to those European indicators. On the second hand, a 
description of policies by using a common frame of the practical policies carried out by the 
countries regions studied under CONVERGE provides additional grounds to qualify the 
quantitative analysis and the relative position of the countries and/or regions.  
 
2.1 Positions of CONVERGE countries in relation to innovation indicators 
 
In order to dispose of instruments to compare the situation in innovation in Europe, the Council of 
Lisbon asked for the elaboration of a set of indicators. Communication (2000) C gave in an annex a 
first list of indicators, grouped into four categories as follows: human resources, production of new 
knowledge, transfer and application of knowledge, and financing of innovation, results and markets. 
 
Table 1 offers a summary of these indicators which allow to carry out comparative analyses and 
collection of the results corresponding to the countries involved in the CONVERGE project 
showing the existence of disparities among them with no relationship between size and innovative 
capacity and skills as one small country, like Ireland, emerges as a relative highly innovative 
country according to these indicators, whereas big economies, within the frame of Europe, like Italy 
and Spain qualify poorly in this respect.  
 
2.2  Mapping of the innovation capabilities of CONVERGE project countries and regions 
 
Fig 1a and b presents a map of the countries position with reference to the four main group of 
indicators of innovation in Europe (table 1) as well as with respect to the two group of tools of 
second level that have been identified along the study (Héraud et al., October 2000). 
  
Fig. 1a registers the relative positions of the regions and countries studied in the CONVERGE 
project with respect to the institutional frame of technological support, as deduced from the 
application of two indicators, human resources and knowledge intensity and efficiencies (see table 1 
for a detailed description of such indicators). These indicators are a reflection of the intensity and 
effectiveness of R&D and education policies essentially. Fig 1b illustrates the positions regarding 
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the functioning of the business sector on the basis of two indicators such as the behaviour of firms 
in innovation and the effects on market and uses of technology (table 1 offers more details on these 
indicators which in essence express the degree of influence of innovation and industrial policies). 
Among the LFRs, Ireland occupies the most positive position in general terms, in spite of her 
lagging in knowledge intensity and efficiency (share of scientific production and patents). The 
relative equivalent or better position of Spain and Portugal with respect to this indicator does not 
reflect in the innovation behaviour and success of their respective business sectors. The well known 
splitting between Northern and Southern Italy is once more put into evidence. 
 
2.3 The case studies on the dynamics of policies 
 
2.3.1 Policies under consideration for the "catching-up" process 
 
The CONVERGE project has attempted to undertake a preliminary, though yet subjective, exercise 
in order to assess the influence of several policies (education/training, R&D, industrial and 
innovation) in a series of indicators related to innovation performance and growth, factors that may 
be helping to the catching-up of  the Less Favoured Regions.  This exercise has been carried out by 
taking into account the following definitions for each policy: 
 
Innovation policy: refers to that policy addressed by funding innovation strategies or R&D projects 
of the firms aiming to apply science,  basic knowledge and technology (tacit and codified) resulting 
either from internal activities or external collaboration with public research centres or universities. 
Example within the EU: Space, Energy and TIC sectors, former BRITE programme, Green Book 
initiative. Main indicators: innovation performance, firms behaviour. 
 
R&D policy: aims to foster the promotion of science base, codified knowledge and infrastructure for 
research in the public sector and in the firms. Examples within the EU: Life Sciences, Health, 
Environment, could include part of the Structural Funds. Mains indicators: knowledge intensities 
and efficiencies. 
 
Education and training policy: concerns those policies and actions addressed to foster development 
of the higher education sector with specific actions on the formation of graduates in science and 
technology, the promotion of postdoctoral exchanges as well as those of highly skilled people 
between countries or between institutions. Examples within the EU: Marie Curie scheme, Shared 
R&D projects. Main indicators: human resources 
 
Industrial policy: refers to the instruments and tools aimed to drive industrial competitiveness, 
funds development and industrial projects from firms. It uses and develops IPR and fiscal 
incentives. Examples within the EU: Patents, common market Main indicators: market and 
technology structural changes in economy. 
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 Fig. 1a . Position of the CONVERGE countries and regions with respect to their technological  
              infrastructure as an indication of R&D and basic innovation capabilities. 
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Fig. 1b . Relative position of the CONVERGE countries and regions in relation to  
              firms innovation behaviour and results as an indication of innovation effectiveness. 
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2.3.2 The case studies 
 
For comparative purposes, the dynamics of the policies has been analysed according to a following 
common frame exploring the arguments underlying the establishment of policies, their goals, who 
and what have been the main stakeholders as well as the outcomes of those policies and 
instruments. This provides grounds to justify the position of the countries and regions in fig. 1a and 
b as well as to assess the policies impact. 
 
The case of Norway 
 
The paper from Norway (Isaksen and Remoee 2001) evaluated three policy tools; TEFT 
(Technology diffusion from research institutes to SMEs); RUSH (Regional development between 
state owned colleges and SMEs) which has in part been carried out in the form of REGINN 
(Regional innovation systems); and NT (The innovation and new technology programme in 
Northern Norway). The information beneath concerns these three policy tools 
 
a) Arguments underlying the establishment of the tools 
 
TEFT: The basic argument was the perceived need for firms to enhance their technological 
capability. SMEs (in Norway firms with less than 100 employees) in particular were the target 
group, as these usually have weak internal resources and a low capability to handle technological 
development on their own. These firms therefore need increased contact with R&D-institutions to 
enhance their competence and innovation activity. Collaboration between SMEs and research 
institutions, however, was seen to be filled with barriers (regarding competence and 'culture'). Thus, 
broker were seen as needed to link research institutions and firms, leading to establishing the 
technology attaché system in the TEFT programme. 
 
RUSH: The arguments behind RUSH resemble those of TEFT of strengthening the innovation 
capability of SMEs. The idea was to develop a organisational model that could provide the 
regionally based colleges in Norway with the means to interact better with the regional industry, 
and thus be an important node in a regional innovation system. The programme founded only the 
efforts of the colleges to change their way of behaviour, i.e. stimulate the college staff to enter into 
contact and development work for regional based firms. Project in firms had to be funded from 
elsewhere. Behind this effort to strengthen the role of colleges was also the idea that these 
institutions were seen as under exploited as instruments for regional economic development. 
Experiences from the Steinbeis Stiftung in Germany was seen as good lessons in transforming the 
colleges to be more actively engaged in regional industrial development.  
 
RUSH was an experimental programme, lasting for 4 years (1994-98), and covering only 4 
colleges. The REGINN programme, initiated in 1997, took over the mandate of RUSH, covering the 
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whole country and both regional colleges and research institutions. Still the argument was to 
increase co-operation between regional knowledge organisations and the industry, however, 
REGINN targeted specific industries or clusters in a region. 
 
NT: The programme targets industry in Northern Norway. This region has a comparatively 
traditional industry, with a low level of R&D. In the mid 1980s a committee was set down to 
propose a strategy to develop Northern Norwegian industry, which focused strongly on growth 
through R&D and innovation. The NT programme was the main initiative that was implemented 
from the plan of the committee. Thus, the main argument was to raise the R&D-intensity and 
innovation activity in Northern Norwegian firms as a way to develop the region 
 
b) Goals 
 
All the tools aim to stimulate different aspects of innovation activity in firms, most notably 
technological innovations. All the tools also aim to stimulate co-operation between R&D milieus 
and firms (mostly SMEs). RUSH and REGINN aim to stimulate co-operation between firms and 
regionally located research organisations and regional colleges, TEFT aims to improve 
collaboration between SMEs and five largest technological research institutions in Norway, while 
NT aim to strengthen contact between what the programme denotes as 'centres of competence' in 
different parts of Norway and abroad and firms in Northern Norway. 
 
More specific aims:  
 
TEFT shall develop firms' ability to become a continuous customer of the R&D system (at least 
25% of the firms that have concluded a technology project in TEFT shall within 2 years contract 
new service from a research institution), and help R&D institutions to reorient themselves towards 
activities more relevant for SMEs. 
 
RUSH shall generate 'additionality' in the colleges, i.e. contribute to improved business relations 
beyond what the colleges would engage in anyway. The goals were related to mobilisation of 
college staff in projects for regional industry and the number of students' projects. REGINN is 
explicitly aimed at contributing to improved co-ordination between all the existing knowledge 
institutions in an area, as well as other policy technology and policy instruments, in stimulating 
increased innovation capability in important industries or clusters in the region.  
 
NT shall contribute in developing the best firms in Northern Norway by investing capital, 
contribute with competence as well as develop networks between firms and between firms and 
knowledge institutions. 
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c) Main stakeholders 
 
The initiative for the TEFT programme (and its forerunner) came from the demand side, i.e. the 
largest technological research institution in Norway (SINTEF). The idea was a support programme 
to enhance the transfer of technology from SINTEF itself to SMEs. The initiative may be seen in 
the light of the criticism meeting SINTEF (particularly in the 1980s and beginning of 1990s) of 
being too much oriented towards big firms and of little value for Norwegian SMEs. SINTEF may 
also be in need of new customers as the institution have a rather low basic funding. The programme, 
and the development of it, was (and is still) supported by the Ministry of Local Government and 
Labour and the Ministry of Trade and Industry. 
 
RUSH: The initiative came from the Norwegian Industrial Association, and the idea developed in 
co-operation with this Association and the Norwegian Research Council. In particular the 
Norwegian industrial attaché in Stuttgart in Germany brought back the idea of the Steinbeis 
Stiftung. The development of the following REGINN programme were initiated by the Ministry of 
Local Affair and Labour and the Norwegian Research Council.  
 
NT: The main stakeholder was the Ministry of Local Government and Labour, responsible for 
regional development in Norway. The responsibility to implement and develop the programme was 
given to the Norwegian Research Council and the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development 
Fund. An independent programme secretariat was set up in Northern Norway that has been very 
important in developing the programme since its start in 1987. 
 
d) Main outcomes 
 
Typical outcomes of the programmes are: 
 
TEFT: Improvement of existing product, development of a new product or improved production 
technology in the firm as the result of a joint project between the firm and researchers. The co-
operation between the firm and the research institution sometimes continues in new innovation 
projects (about 30% of the firms engage in a new procurement from their own initiative with 2 
years after completion of a technology project). 
 
RUSH/REGINN: Development of new process technology, organisation methods, knowledge etc. 
jointly between a local network of firms in the same industrial sector and a regional college or 
research institution. The project will also likely lead to more extensive and closer collaboration 
between the firms and the college/research institution in the future. The RUSH programme to some 
extent managed to mobilise more college staff to enter into project for the regional industry. The 
concrete results of this interaction has not been assessed, however, it seem to be fairly meagre.  
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NT: Introduction of a new product or process on the market, resulting from a project co-financed by 
the NT programme. NT staff often acts as broker to couple the firm with research institutions and 
other firms in accomplishing the project. The programme seems to be successful in hitting its target 
group of quite resourceful firms, increase the innovation activity and capability in these firms, 
which result in new innovations on the market. This is achieved with a comparatively high cost per 
project.  
 
e) General assessment 
 
Norway is a country that has been evolving a good position in the wealth context taking profit of its 
geographical position, natural resources and a relative strategy of education and innovation support 
to SMES; it reveals good performance in relation to human and innovative behaviour of the firms. 
However there are limits in the R&D base and in the market success of the firms. 
 
The cases of ALSACE and BADEN 
 
This study is centred in the case of Alsace. Baden is considered a reference for comparison. 
 
a and b) Main goals and arguments underlying the establishment of policies 
 
ALSACE.  
 
Alsace is relatively rich (in GDP per head and household income) and has a good level of 
technological knowledge and general education for European standards. A significant contrast with 
neighbouring German regions like Baden can nevertheless be observed, mainly in terms of 
technological output (as measured with patents statistics for instance) and firms' strategic power, 
including innovative behaviour which is traditionally very strong in the South-West of Germany - at 
least in the second half of the XXth century.  
 
- Academic institutions are strong. ITIs located in Alsace are relatively specialised in basic research. 
This scientific supply does not match ideally with the local knowledge demand, since regional 
economic activities are not often "science-based". Thus, Alsace has no real regional system of 
innovation. Important elements of innovation system, like public labs or branch plants, are located 
wihin the regional territory, but these actors are not regionally linked in a coherent system.  
- Business attitudes are positive towards incremental innovation and international development. The 
typical Alsatian firm is a relatively efficient SME in a "medium tech" activity. There are also a lot 
of (sometimes large) branch plants depending on external (national or international) governance, 
drawing their knowledge and strategic factors from networks that are external to the region. 
- The regional institutions have always strongly favoured Direct Foreign Investment (FDI), and this 
policy revealed very successful. As a result, industrial activity and employment are satisfying (for 
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French standards). But strategic decisions are less and less taken at the region's level: Alsace tends 
to be a medium tech production platform. 
 
Then, in terms of innovation policy, the goals are: 
 
- increasing involvement of science: inciting university labs and other ITIs to develop more contacts 
with firms, to transfer technology and knowledge, to take into account the social and economic 
environment when designing their research strategy; 
 
- networking the firms for innovation: inciting SMEs, particularly in traditional sectors, to regroup 
and develop collective strategies; they are supposed to learn innovative attitudes with the help of 
ITIs (typically: interface organisations between public research and industry, like CRITT 
specialised in new materials, lasers, production technologies, etc.) but also by co-operating with 
other firms ("filieres" policy for instance). 
 
- transfer of technology through transfer of personnel: transferring S&T knowledge to a SME is 
often difficult insofar as such knowledge is in a complex codified form; psychological attitudes 
within the firm (also at the head) add to the difficulty of the transfer; the right way to induce such 
innovative learnings (learning technologies, and learning to learn which means accepting 
innovation) goes through the transfer of personnel: in the case of a traditional Alsatian firm, 
younger technicians appear to be the ideal vector (CORTECHS procedure), rather than engineers or 
scientists. 
 
- exogenous development: maintaining ambitious FDI policy in order to help renewing the industrial 
fabric. 
 
BADEN 
 
The region belongs to the powerful Land of Baden-Wurtemberg, in the midst of the European 
industrial and innovative core. S&T level is high, thanks to firms' as well as ITI's activities. A long 
tradition of intermediation organisms and a clever governance strategy have helped to link actors 
into a real regional innovation system. The knowledge basis and knowledge production are 
relatively applied in nature. This leads to very good results in medium technology activities, but 
concerns are increasingly quoted in the field of new science-based domains like biotechnologies, 
NICT, etc. Is the Baden-Wurtemberg traditional innovation system (including mental attitudes) fit 
for the new vintage of innovative sectors? The educational and training system has been very 
efficient until now, but starts showing some drawbacks: too strong professional identities, leading to 
insufficient flexibility and difficulties to organise necessary business reshaping or adapt to 
technology fusion (in nanotechnologies for instance). 
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In comparison with Alsace, we can consider the following specificities: 
 
- noticeable efficiency of traditional institutions like Steinbeis Foundation, in informing and 
supporting firms for innovative projects; it is not easy to imitate such a model, since institutional 
setting is quite different in a French region, that has developed local applications of standard models 
of institutions and procedures designed by the central State; but it is worthwhile noting that 
Steinbeis started recently to operate in Alsace, in co-operation with local institutions. 
 
- more important role of KIBS (knowledge intensive business services) in sharing and capitalising 
innovative knowledge between actors; these private firms significantly contribute to the efficiency 
of the innovation system in Baden; one policy recommendation for Alsace could be to help 
indirectly firms through supporting KIBS' creation and development; 
 
- the policy has been more focused on firms' creation than on supporting existing firms; this is the 
way chosen for renewing the economic environment and changing general attitudes towards radical 
innovation; this is also possibly a political orientation to favour in Alsace. 
 
c) Stakeholders 
 
The stakeholders in the process of design and implementation of the policies are in a typical multi-
level space in the case of a French region like Alsace: to a significant extent, the policy is designed 
in co-opearation (or negociation) between regional institutions and State organisms. Policy setting 
is completely different in Germany since innovation policy is a clear reponsability of regions 
(Länder). 
 
In the case of Alsace, private stakeholders are also largely external actors because of the very high 
level of FDI. About the  half of Alsatian employees in industry depend on foreign capital. This is a 
logical consequence of the continuing policy of "territorial marketing" of regional authorities, 
whose positive aspects are low unemployment rate and constant renewal of economic activities' 
portfolio, but that has also some potential negative aspects in terms of local governance. 
 
University and other ITIs play an increasing role on the regional innovation arena, but they are still 
involved in networks extending largely outside the region.  
 
d) Outcomes 
 
* The policy of technology transfer through personnel (technicians) movement is a success. 
* The policy of networking firms is only partially a success. 
* Increasing the involvement of the scientific community seems to be a long process; one of the 
problem for the regional authorities is that such involvement is not mainly local. 
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* Exogenous development (including innovative aspects) through FDI seems to be a sort of de facto 
policy paradigm in Alsace. 
 
* Remark for Baden: the ambitious policy of firms' creation is probably a good model 
(complementary to the policy of supporting existing business), but the outcomes are considered 
sometimes as slightly disappointing, at least in comparison with the level of policy efforts. 
 
The case of Ireland 
 
a) Arguments  
 
Ireland has been progressively recognising since the 1980s that the World Economy is technology 
driven. Policies and socio-economic efforts have been aimed to fill the gaps in R&D, education and 
innovation of the country with respect to the more successful smaller industrial nations in Europe to 
compete in the global economy. When it comes to R&D spending, the need to increase it was 
deemed essential. The accumulation of human capital to increase the coverage and "productive-
orientation" of the internationally respected Irish education system has been considered a strategic 
goal. 
 
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, Irish Industrial Policy has, through the operational goal of 
export-led manufacturing output growth, sought to achieve its core underlying objective of jobs 
creation to reduce Ireland´s high unemployment figures (a result of late industrialisation and 
continuing flow of manpower out of agriculture) and stem the flood  of emigration. With the 
marked economic turnaround from 1993 and the advent of virtual full employment the focus of 
Enterprise Policy has shifted from jobs creation to a drive for enhanced productivity and 
international competitiveness and a structural shift to more value-added industries and sectors to 
fend off the threat from newly industrialising competitors. The new remit for enterprise 
development agencies is to share the risk with competitors who seek to develop their capabilities in 
key areas such as business strategy, human resources (management and staff skill sets), R&D and 
innovation, and e-business.  
 
b) Goals 
 
- Increase investment in R&D in line with national development policy. 
- Supporting the key technologies. 
- Promote more collaboration between the actors of the National System of Innovation. 
- Provide a highly productive and profitable enterprise sector to act as the main engine of 
economic growth. 
- Boost the supply of highly skilled, creative and flexible workforce. 
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-  Encourage moves from unemployment to employment and participation in the labour force. 
Increase the level, relevance and quality of private sector training. 
- Make finance more readily available to enterprise, especially to SMEs and start-ups. 
- Review tax and benefit systems to actively supporting employability and job creation. 
 
c) Stakeholders  
 
Ministerial Departments (Education & Science, Enterprise Trade and Employment, Social Welfare. 
Development Agencies (FORFAS, Enterprise Ireland, IDA) 
 
d) Outcomes 
 
- Public funding for R&D as a percentage of total government budget increased steadily from 
1990 to 1999. Business Expenditure on R&D (BERD) is on par with EU average and with 
economies such as Norway, Denmark, Netherlands. 
- GNP per capita converged from 79% EU average in 1994 to over 90% by 1999. 
- The unemployment rate fell by some 9 percentage points in the five years to April 1999. 
Unemployment was down to 5% by 1999. 
- The value of manufacturing exports climbed significantly from 16.5 billion euro in 1991 to 47 
billion euro in 1981. Foreign direct investment (FDI) performance was again to fore. 
- Employment in internationally traded services grew from 10,000 in 1991 to 40,000 in 1998, and 
the FDI component increased from 58% to 70%. 
- The gross value added (GUA) of the manufacturing sector grew by 95% in real terms from 1991 
to 1998, powered by a vigorous output performance of the FDI cohort which was concentrated 
in two sectors, Chemicals and Electrical Equipment. 
- Irish-owned industry reversed the decline in employment that prevailed since the mid 1960s. 
Productivity (net output per person) in indigenous industry grew 4.2% per annual in real terms 
in the late 1990s, helping to boost average indigenous profitability to 8.8%  of sales by 1998. 
This is less than a quarter of the profit rate achieved by FDI manufacturing companies and 
reflects the persistent heavy bias of  Irish-owned industry in traditional low-productivity sectors. 
Moreover, comparing productivity in individual Irish-owned sectors with the performance of 
indigenous industry in other  EU countries reveals substantial deficits. 
- Indicators related to knowledge intensive activities reveal a positive trend and place Ireland well 
down in the league tables in the company of the other Cohesion LFR regions, though growing 
fast. 
- The venture capital supply has been growing in Ireland along the 1990s but is concentrated too 
narrowly in Communications, Electronics and Biotechnology sectors. 
- The total tax burden was significantly reduced in the recent period. 
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- Ireland characterises by a low corporate tax strategy. One downside of this strategy has been 
that it tended to discourage FDI from performing tax-allowable activities such as R&D in 
Ireland. The government is reconsidering this "disincentive". 
 
e) General assessment: 
 
Ireland is performing well in educating skilled personnel and in their employment as well as in the 
behaviour and commercial success of firms. The low rate performance corresponds to the efficiency 
in the production of knowledge and its transfer to technology and innovation firms´ activities. 
 
The case of Italy 
 
a) Arguments  
 
Innovation  policies specifically designed to foster R&D and innovation in LFRs have traditionally 
been rather limited in the case of Italy and implicitly contained in the main industrial-oriented 
policy scheme. Innovation policies have been un fact indirectly contained in the “intervento 
straordinario”,  the latter being by far the major policy action carried out during the period 50-80s to 
tackle the historical backwardness of the South of Italy. This broad policy scheme was based on 
large infra-structural investments, financial support to private investments and settling of public 
owned firms in capital intensive sectors. Such form of public intervention has largely failed. This 
was a result of the isolation of the industrial settlements (the so called “cathedrals in the desert”), 
the progressive sclerosis of the productive system, the low responsiveness of the latter to the market 
dynamics and last but not least the presence of severe management failures. During the 80’s the 
logic behind the “intervento straordinario” has progressively changed starting to take on board 
specific measures to sustaining R&D and innovation (the 64/86 low). This was a natural result of 
the growing awareness among policy makers of the importance of technology and innovation for 
sustaining economic growth  and catching up processes. Another specific tool introduced in the 80’s 
has been the inclusion of quotas for LFRs in the main financial schemes supporting innovation 
projects (the 46 laws). Probably the most effective set of industrial and technology policies 
introduced were those sustaining investment in fixed capital which have been a major instrument to 
modernize the productive structure of Italian industry in general and southern firms in particular. 
However the extremely favourable conditions offered to firms to purchase new vintages of capital 
have led firms to over-expand their production capacity instead of strengthening their internal 
innovative capabilities. In the last decade industrial and technology policies for the LFRs have been 
heavily shaped by European policies directed to Objective 1 regions and in particular by the 
European structural funds.  
 
The dominant role that that the central government has historically played in  the design and 
implementation of industrial and innovation policies mentioned above has prevented local 
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administrations from developing the necessary policy-designing and  policy-making capabilities. 
This is probably the most negative and long lasting heritage of the “intervento straordinario”, 
especially in the light of the on going devolution process of policy functions and responsibilities 
from central government to regions. Also the recent experience of EU structural funds in Italy 
shows that their actual utilization and effectiveness has crucially depended on the competencies of 
local policy makers and administrators. In fact, EU structural funds ion order to be effective require 
the presence of a well structured and coherent policy strategy by local regional authorities. Only in 
this case it is possible to channel the structural funds towards those policy targets leading to a supra-
local value added in terms of economic growth.  
 
b) Goals  
 
In the light of the considerations made above it is possible to state that till very recently no explicit 
goals were targeted by national or regional policies in the areas R&D and innovation. Nevertheless 
in the middle of 70’s a few specific initiatives have been launched such as schemes to favour 
University-industry links and the emergence of technological centres. More recently the 64)86 law 
has introduced special schemes to support University  centres, local R&D and innovation networks 
as well as the setting up of scientific infrastructures in LFRs. This actions were stopped at the 
beginning of 90’s when a general plan to set up 13 science parks in different Italian LFRs  was 
implemented 
 
c) Stakeholders  
 
On a formal/official ground the main stakeholders in the process of design and  
implementation of industrial and innovation policies have been the central government, the relevant 
ministers and regional authorities. However, a much more substantial role has been played by the 
leading economic and political actors operating in the various regions: large firms, local lobbies, 
influential politicians. Such actors have acted outside a structured and coherent policy framework. It 
is also interesting to point out the increasing importance over the last few years of  “collective 
actors”. An effective legislative measure recently introduced in Italy is one setting up the “patti 
territoriali” (territorial pacts) which through an articulated set of incentives aim at  mobilizing local 
private and public resources and institutions in the design and implementation of programmes of 
industrial development at a local level. This measure has been adopted at the European level with 
the introduction of the “territorial pacts on employment”. 
 
d) Outcomes 
 
The general outcome of such policies, where successful, have been a reduction of the economic and 
technological gap between LFRs regions and the much more developed  regions in the north of the 
country. The results have been rather uneven across LFRs with a few areas witnessing rapid 
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industrial growth and others continuing lagging behind. As far as innovation is concerned this 
catching up process has largely consisted in an alignment to technological  and productive best 
practices. This was again a result of the predominant role of policy schemes supporting firms’ 
investment in fixed capital. 
 
e) General assessment 
North Italy possesses a good performance in terms of skills and knowledge assets in industrial 
innovation and less in R&D. The stronger position N1 might have as compared to Alsace in not 
reflected in a single point in fig. 1a and b but may result from an integration of the different 
positions recorded for N1 in such figure: fig. 1a relates to R&D capacities preferentially whereas 
fig. 1b records strengths and activities in innovation capacities. Southern Italy is clearly lagging 
behind by all indicators. 
The case of Portugal 
 
a) Arguments and context 
 
Portugal started to emerge from a long lethargic period of isolation and backwardness in the 1960s. 
It is possible to locate the foundations of a modern S&T policy in that period, particularly after the 
setting up of the National Board of S&T (JNICT) in 1967.  
 
Portugal has meanwhile registered important advances, from its initial situation as a declining 
colonial power to the more recent status as an European catching up country. In fact, the Portuguese 
economy has been characterised as in a trajectory of convergence since joining the EC: while in 
1986 GDP per capita (in ppp) was only 55% of the EC average, the most recent data indicate that 
the value of this indicator is now about 75% of the average. Despite this progress, the structure of 
activities and the international specialization have remained however concentrated in low-tech 
sectors. In addition to that, when measuring without the ppp “filter” the relative labour productivity 
of the manufacturing industries, one finds that it stayed below 40% of the respective EU average 
during the 1990s (Godinho and Mamede, 2001).   
 
b) Goals 
 
In the context of evolution highlighted above, it is possible to say that the science and technology 
policies over the recent decades have mainly addressed the structural backwardness problems, with 
an implicit overall objective of contributing to the country’s development, namely through the 
preparation of human resources holding advanced qualifications in S&T.  
 
Despite that overall implicit goal, it is possible to identify as a prominent characteristic of those 
S&T policies that they have not remained stable, in terms of both their strategic orientation and 
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specific goals. It is therefore possible to consider four periods since the 1960s. In what follows we 
will identify those periods and refer briefly to the specific goals that were pursued in each of them. 
 
Stage 1 (late 1960s/early 1970s). The central goal had to do with the creation of a “national S&T 
system”. For that purpose investments were carried out in relation to both the national R&D 
laboratories and the research facilities in the universities. There was an aim of acquiring minimal 
critical masses in some areas, through the training of young scientists abroad and the setting up of 
teams in specific research areas. At the same time JNICT acted as a funding agency and started to 
promote the co-ordination machinery needed to provide coherence to the whole S&T system.  
 
Stage 2 (late 1970s/early 1980s). In this period a clear preoccupation arose of gearing the existing 
institutions towards addressing social and economic needs. Strategic (“practical”) goals were 
defined and there was an attempt of developing and strengthening the R&D capabilities around the 
main economic specialization poles and also in the emerging high-tech areas (IT, biotechnology and 
new materials). 
 
Stage 3 (late 1980s/early 1990s). In combination with the industrial policy, efforts were developed 
in order to create a technological infrastructure and the adequate mechanisms for university-
industry collaboration. There was a perception in this period that “windows of opportunity” existed 
for the country leapfrogging into the “new paradigm”. At the same time new policy actions to 
support private business R&D were implemented. 
 
Stage 4 (late 1990s). The major goal in this most recent period has been the internationalisation of 
Portuguese research, through the attainment of standards of excellence. The professionallization of 
academic R&D has also been sought through the introduction of systematic evaluation procedures.  
 
Despite the variations in orientation, two common goals have been present throughout these 4 
stages. Firstly, a significant part of the financial resources has always been devoted to advanced 
training of scientists and engineers. Secondly, a share of those resources has also been consistently 
oriented towards the support of academic research activities.  
 
c) Stakeholders 
 
We must clarify that the “S&T policy” we have been describing has been – with the partial 
exclusion of stages 2 and 3 above – basically a “science policy”. The country’s “technology policy” 
on the other hand has been mainly associated with the industrial policy, even though this has never 
been assumed in an explicit way. The assumption of the need of a technology policy, addressing the 
needs of firms and the industrial sectors, has been particularly present since the PEDIP 
interventions were implemented as part of the 1st and 2nd Community Support Framework 
programmes (1988-1999). Those programmes had conceptions, in what regards technology policy 
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aims, relatively convergent with those expressed in stages 2 and 3 referred to above, even though 
articulation and full coherence between both the S&T policy and industrial policy were never fully 
attained. This situation is in part a responsibility of clashing cultures between the bureaucracies of 
the S&T department (more recently with a status of Ministry) and the Industry Ministry (see on this 
Caraça, 1999).  
 
Other problems have also hindered the possibility of a persistent S&T policy, with strategic goals 
and continuity throughout the most recent decades. The bureaucracy within the S&T department has 
never stabilised, to give continuation to existing procedures and policy approaches (Henriques, 
1999). More importantly, the relatively low technological dynamism of the prevailing economic 
activities has meant that the private sector has never performed an active role in the setting of the 
national S&T priorities. This weakness has been responsible for the fact that specific interest groups 
have been able to capture the S&T policy in different moments, driving it according to their partial 
needs and interests (Godinho, 1993).. As a result, we arrived into the late 1990s with an S&T policy 
and an industrial policy relatively at the odds with each other, without consistent common 
objectives and without articulation of interventions between them. This led to a situation that has 
been characterised as of “systemic failure”, in the sense that the major stakeholders have not been 
able to collaborate in the setting up of a proper innovation system geared towards adequate goals.  
 
d) Outcomes 
 
Despite the highlighted fragilities, some progress has been reached in terms of acquisition and 
accumulation of technological capability. FDI outlays into the country have given a positive 
contribution with respect to that. Another exogenous factor – the disciplines imposed by the EU 
within the CSFs – was relevant in stimulating the development of systematic mechanisms to 
evaluate national policies (Godinho et al. 2000).  
 
Other major outcomes include: 
- Development of a professionally staffed university, with a continuously growing number of 
students (22 thousand in 1960, 367 thousand in 2000); 
- Creation and strengthening of a few areas of academic excellence, with several teams 
integrated in leading international networks; 
- Setting up of a technological infrastructure (in some parts effective, in others not so much); 
- Development of some poles of advanced technological endogenous capabilities (but 
heterogeneity remains in this respect the dominant characteristic); 
- Emergence in a few areas of systemic innovation dynamics (yet a full “national innovation 
system” remains to be developed). 
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The Case of Spain 
 
a) Arguments 
 
Spain has been holding a laggard position in science and technology issues and related indicators 
when compared with most wealthy countries, essentially after correcting for the demographic 
factor. There have been difficulties for developing an internationally competitive scientific 
community - Spain did not enjoy a "golden century for science" -  and there has been a lack of 
tradition in recognising the political and economic relevance of science and technology as factors 
necessary for growth and development. 
 
In critical moments - technocratic reform in the 50s, evolution of democratic transition with the 
upsurge of the Socialist Party to governance in the 80s, the integration of Spain into the Common 
Europe in 1986 - the discourse of "modernisation" has paid attention to science and technology as 
instruments for such a process of modernisation. 
 
b) Goals 
 
The policies and related instruments put into force for reforming the situation on science, 
technology and innovation, were aimed: 
• To increase the size of the system of research and innovation in both the public and private 
sectors. 
• To introduce science and technology issues in the political agenda. 
• To correct for structural deficits at the institutional, organisational and geographic levels. 
• Under the great political goal of improving the coordination between resources and political 
actors, the specific aims were the following: 
• To increase the public resources devoted to R&D activities, with the hope to drive also 
an increase in the research and innovation efforts of the private sector. 
• To promote the competitiveness of the scientific community in the world context. 
• To introduce the culture of research and innovation into the businesses and their 
managers. 
• To foster the links between the science realm and the industries, in order to allow for a 
better use of the knowledge produced by universities and public research organisms. 
• To favour dialogue and collaboration between the political actors of the State and the 
Regions.  
 
c) Stakeholders 
 
One of the most important tools at stake has been the Law for Scientific and Technological 
Development, known popularly as the “Law for Science”, enacted in 1986. It has been the main 
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political instrument for those goals that were implemented by the National Plan for Research and 
Development which was designed as the functional and operative instrument of the Law. Its first 
edition was launched in 1988 and lasted until  1991. Two other editions, corresponding to the 1992-
1995 and 1996-1999 periods, have followed.  Regional R&D Plans for different regions also 
followed. The role of relevant representatives from academia and the scientific community had been 
decisive for these political initiatives at Governments and Parliaments levels. 
 
 After the general elections of 1996, the conservative Partido Popular took the lead. The new 
government introduced some changes in the organisation of the science and technology 
management system. While keeping the spirit of the "Law for Science" and attempting to correct for 
one of the main limitations at institutional level of the system such as it is the lack of coordination 
between the institutions  responsible for the programmes, the science and technology political 
agenda was placed under the direct responsability of the Prime Minister. An Office for Science and 
Technology (OCYT from its name in Spanish, Oficina de Ciencia y Tecnología) was established 
and set under the authority of the Ministry of Presidency, chaired by a Vice-Prime Minister and in 
charge of the coordination of the Ministerial Cabinet. The main tasks of OCYT during the period 
93-99 have been the management of the Third National Plan and the design and elaboration of the 
fourth National Plan which has shifted and enriched its scope towards the innovation process as it 
has been defined as a plan for research, development, and innovation (R+D+I). 
 
Before the implementation of the fourth version of the National Plan, the first one incorporating 
innovation as a clear target, the elections of year 2000 won again by the Partido Popular led to a 
new reorganisation with the creation of the Ministry for Science and Technology. In this last 
direction, academia and scientific community seem to have been loosing influence. In any case, 
business and political actors have played a limited role and their impact must be understated. 
 
d) Outcomes (and General assessment) 
 
• All the analyses, data and indicators, support the contention that the efforts carried out in Spain 
along the last half of the twentieth century have led to the building of a System of Research and 
Development with satisfactory scientific outputs. However its outcomes in relation to the 
building of innovation capacity in the productive sector have been rather limited. The public 
R&D system and the business system have followed separate paths. 
 
It is likely to conclude that Spain do possess a National R&D System but the country is still 
lacking  a specifically built National System of Innovation shaped according to the main 
characteristics and specifities of the country. However, there are patches of systems of 
innovation in some of the Spanish regions (Cataluña, País Vasco, perhaps Madrid), precisely the 
most industrialised ones. 
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• Economic criteria do not allow a grouping of the regions of Spain in terms of innovation 
capacities and assets. Non-Objective 1 regions are characterised very differently according to 
their research and technological efforts. Three of them (Madrid, Cataluña and País Vasco) are 
the leaders in these efforts whereas Baleares and La Rioja which are the leaders in economic 
wealth are the laggards in these efforts.  
 
The data on employment profiles of the regions point out in the same directions: high 
heterogeneity, lack of correspondence between the wealth of regions and the predominant 
employment rates in traditional innovative sectors, similar shares of employment rates between 
sectors in regions with marked differences in their wealth status. 
 
• Objective 1 regions share a predominant role of the public sector in their R&D efforts, although 
there are also marked differences between them. In general, it can be said that Spanish less-
developed regions do possess incomplete, “primitive” systems of innovation. 
 
• There is a poor correlation between the degree of economic convergence with Europe and the 
level of research and technological efforts (potential innovation capacity) as illustrated by the 
cases of Baleares and La Rioja or by the positive economic performance during the last years of 
some Objective 1 regions (Castilla-León, Castilla-La Mancha, Extremadura…) grounding its 
positive trajectory essentially in the agricultural (agro-food) sector. 
 
• The percentage of innovative firms in Spain is lower than those of most European member 
countries. Moreover, the Spanish innovative firms are less active in R&D activities than their 
European counter parts. The trend seems to be changing to a slight increase in the number of 
innovative firms and essentially to a strong increase in the R&D vocation of those firms. 
 
• The most innovative sectors in Spain are those behaving as such since long (agriculture and 
manufacturing industries are showing better performance than services, energy, building) 
 
Among the innovative sectors, the industries belonging to areas of innovative tradition standing 
at least for twenty years are the most prone to perform R&D activities and programmes, i.e. 
pharmaceutical, electronic and optical material and equipment, transport material. 
 
• Spain is moving towards convergence with Europe in economic, and innovation and technology 
indicators, but the paths of convergence for these two parameters are moving quite differently 
and do not match according to geographical and temporal parameters. 
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3. Assessment of the influence of policies related to innovation on the economic 
progress of the less favoured regions of Europe. 
 
Table 2 draws on the information gathered along the CONVERGE project, and from a meeting held 
in Madrid (October 2000), with the specific aim of exploring the possibilities of carrying out an 
assessment of the influence of policies on the development of the four countries involved in the 
CONVERGE project, that either qualify as a whole less-favoured country or possess regions with 
this qualification. The annotations about positive and neutral effects of the policies are self-
explanatory while the note as counter effects reflects a mismatch between the goals and outcomes 
of a given policy with the trajectories of countries and regions akin to the corresponding indicator, 
i.e. a policy inspired and supported by big multinational firms when such firms are not operating in 
the country or region; a policy driving to the formation of skilled personnel who does not fit to the 
demands of the internal labour market. As it is recorded in table 2, none of the policies appears to 
show a complete, integral positive influence profile on the whole of the factors. There are evident 
differences between the four countries into consideration, thus giving additional support to the 
"importance of diversity" in the shaping of Europe. Nevertheless, two of the policies -those related 
to  R&D and innovation- show the greater degree of homogeneity and positive influence among the 
countries, with the exception of their potential effects on inducing structural changes in economy.  
It is obvious to acknowledge that the exercise on the assessment of policies related to innovation 
and their influences on economic parameters is not an easy one. It must depend on the potential 
beneficiaries or on the time reference. This attempt has taken into account the potential benefits of 
the country or regions as a whole for attaining convergence and has been looking to the period of 
building a common Europe. 
 
3.1 Some critical points and considerations  
 
a) The CONVERGE project was aimed to learn how the less developed regions (LFRs) of Europe 
have been evolving to design and put into practice strategies and actions to "catch-up" the most 
developed regions of the European Union. Though not originally addressed as a 
"benchmarking" exercise, the comparative nature of its analytical approach makes the project to 
be considered like a benchmark of the policies of LFRs with some developed regions of Europe 
in relation to innovation and economic wealth. In this line of thought, the CONVERGE project 
seems to match with one of the mains streams of the European Commission and Member States 
agenda in relation to research. This exercise has been performed by using a combined 
methodology with indicators proposed by the European Commission and qualitative approaches 
developed along the project.  
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b) In a "knowledge-based" economy or "learning" economy it seems reasonable to attribute a 
central role to innovation activities and to the policies that promote them3. This central role 
attributed to innovation implies that the policies targeted to its promotion have to be considered 
not as a result of an isolated, single strategy but as the confluence of a series of policies like 
those related to education, specific R&D, social cohesion, industry, fiscal and commercial 
aspects. The sum and/or interactions of the outcomes of these different policies must be taken 
into account when analysing the possible effects of innovation policies and initiatives. 
 
c) In the context of a "knowledge-based" economy and in an increasing global world, the concept 
of National System of Innovation (NSI) -or its regional counterpart, RSI- seems to provide an 
adequate ground to being used as indicator of the input factors and outcome elements 
("strengths") that measure the ability of a country or region to cope with the requirements (or 
challenges) imposed by the current socio-economic context. In order to evaluate the level and 
degree of the construction of an efficient NSI (RSI) for each country or region, a series of 
traditional input and output indicators as well as the data derived from the Community 
Innovation Survey have been used.  
 
d) Within a frame of diversity, the CONVERGE study has allowed to identify a series of common 
facts and features as the following: 
 
- the critical importance of human resources extending the need for a good science  and technical 
base to the requirement of skilled, well trained  personnel for performing satisfactorily all the 
activities involved in the efficient management of innovation (and R&D) policies. 
- The creation of infrastructures and interface institutions has followed patterns of imitations. By 
leaving aside their own structural deficits with respect to bureaucracy, firms behaviours, actors 
habits, the LFRs may have overestimated the positive influence of mimicking policies and 
decisions adopted by more developed countries. 
- There seems to exist difficulties to identify when innovation is performed and where there are 
benefits through it and by  the development of spillovers, in particular because this analytical 
approach is applied in a given geographical context, to a complex system where there is 
coexistence of back-ward regions and firms, high technology firms and emerging technologies, 
each having its specific rules for emergence and holding different dynamics. 
 
                                                 
3 In a Conference held in Brussels (15-16 March, 2001) under the title "The contribution of socio-economic research to 
the benchmarking of RTD policies in Europe", Bengt Aake Lundvall who was the leading discussant made the 
provocative statement that innovation should be, in the present context, the dominant issue in the political agenda of 
EU. He went further in the final session of the Conference to raise the utopian proposal  that Europe should shift the 
focus of policies from  economy to innovation. Accordingly (Lundvall dixit), innovation (and RTD) policies at the 
European level should be placed under the direct responsability of the President of the Commission. In our opinion, this 
may introduce the innovation issues at the centre of interests of the EU Parliament and attract more media attention. 
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Table 2. Assessment of the influence of several policies on some factors that may influence the economic wealth of the Europe LFRs. 
Innovation performance Education/Qualified employment Firms behaviour Structural changes in economy 
Policies 
 
Ir It P Sp Ir It P Sp Ir It P Sp Ir It P Sp 
Regional  +  +  +  o  +  +  +  o _ 
National + + + o o + o o ++ + + o _ + + o _ 
Innovation 
European ++ + + + o _ _ _ + + + + + + + _ 
Regional  +  +  +  +  +  +  _  _ 
National + + + + + + + + ++ + + ++ ++ _ _ _ 
R&D 
European + + + + + + + + + + + + + _ _ _ 
Regional  o  o  o  +  o  o  o  o 
National + o + o + + + ++ o o o _ + o o o 
Education 
Training 
European o o o o + + + o o o o o o o o o _ 
Regional  +  +  o  o _  +  +  +  + 
National + + o + + o o o _ + + + + + + + + 
Industrial 
European + o o o o o o o o o _ _ + o o o 
 
                        ++ : very positive;  +: positive;  o: neutral;     : counter effects              
                         Source: own elaboration (CONVERGE project)    
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